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ON JUSTIFYING ENFORCED REQUIREMENTS:
A Reply to Baier
DAVID LYONS

There are limits to the possible subjects of justification. Typically, it concerns human behavior and things that human intervention can affect. Failing
special circumstances, it makes no sense to speak of justifying the weather.

There may be other limits to the class of possible subjects for justification; for
example, it is sometimes said that a thing cannot be justified unless it has been
indicted, though it is not clear how this claim should be taken. For there
simply may be no point in bothering to justify something that is not suspect in
some way, and the relevant condition can generally be satisfied by no more
than an imaginary challenge or the mere request for a justification. But,
suppose we assume for the sake of argument that justification has such narrow
limits. Even within them, Professor Baier says, justification is not always
possible. In one sense this is true, in another false. It is always possible for
someone to offer a justification, for it to be accepted, and in such respects for
there to be one. In another sense, however, which Baier seems to use, the

existence of a justification is independent of what people give or accept. In this
important sense, some possible candidates for justification simply cannot be
justified, just because they aren't good enough. They fail to meet the minimum
standards.

I begin with this elementary point so that my own attitude towards justification will be clear and to help us avoid being misled by some remarks in

Baier's paper. He says, for example, that he is concerned with the matter of
"people being required unconditionally or categorically to measure up to
certain standards," or, in other words, with what he calls our "practice" of
requiring people to justify or to be able to justify their conduct. He continues:
"To say that they are thus categorically required to measure up to these
standards is to imply that if they do not, then the community is entitled to

compel them to do so," etc. (emphasis added). But this way of putting the
point surely needs qualification, for the mere fact that a community has or

accepts categorical requirements does not entitle them to anything, except,
perhaps, in a qualified or technical sense. Their laws may make it lawful to
use coercion, and this can be said to involve a kind of entitlement. But it is
one that does not settle the problem of justification, for it merely amounts to
their having methods of compulsion which can be challenged from (let us say)
a moral point of view, with no guarantee that these methods meet the minimum standards. Laws and legal sanctions are not always justified. The same
applies to the community's customs and conventional morality. Its members
may believe that they have the right, the moral right, to use force, and they

may act accordingly; but to believe that one has a right is no more to have a
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right than to give a justification is really to have one, in the relevant sense. Of
any merely accepted requirements and sanctions we can always ask: What
justification can be given for them? For any at all, or for these in particular?
I believe that Baier would agree so far, and I am therefore confident that we
can understand the main argument of his paper as an attempt tojustify the use
of coercive sanctions in support of certain requirements. It is also an attempt

to indicate, in very general terms, the kind of requirement that might justifiably be enforced. Baier takes little for granted, so his enterprise is really quite
ambitious. It is inevitable, therefore, that I should have a number of questions

and criticisms, if only because his argument is necessarily compressed, abstract
and sketchy. But it is also full of complexity and subtle detail, and I hope that
I will be pardoned for ignoring many interesting points made and questions
raised. I shall concentrate my remarks on what I take to be the main elements

of his main argument.
This has two stages. Baier first defends a loosely defined set of standards for
minimally acceptable behavior. Then he argues that the enforcement of some
can be justified. I shall take these in turn; but I shall also try to show that they
are more closely related than Baier seems to suggest.
The standards for minimally acceptable behavior are what Baier calls

"categorical" or "overriding" precepts, meaning, apparently, that they are
never to be broken (unless, perhaps, one may be broken in favor of another
of the precepts). Baier argues that a set of such precepts could legitimately
serve as the minimal social standards for behavior if their content is "such

that it is preferable from anyone's point of view to have these precepts accepted as overriding, rather than let natural inclinations prevail."
This claim gives rise to some obvious questions. There are many possible
tests: how does Baier come to this particular one? Why is the selection of this

test not arbitrary? Is it based, perhaps, on Baier's notion of someone's "having
a reason" to do something? If so, it also needs further clarification, for sometimes Baier seems to understand "having a reason" in terms of self-interest,
actual or perceived, while other times Baier seems to fix it to having felt
concerns. Thus, in one place Baier indicates that one has a reason to do something if it would favorably affect his life (or if it seems that way to him), while
in another place Baier says that a person who is unconcerned about others

does not have to have a reason to follow other-regarding percepts.
One might also ask how egoism and altruism (the rule of self- and otherregard respectively) drop out of the argument. They were said to be preferable
as overriding considerations to the rule of natural inclinations, and one might

infer from this that they pass Baier's supposed test for legitimate precepts,
which is simply that they be preferable from anyone's point of view to the
rule of natural inclinations. Baier says that they are not as helpful in settling
conflicts as some (unspecified) alternative set of overriding precepts would be.
Since they are disqualified, this remark suggests that Baier's stated test gives
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for selecting minimum standards. Is utility in settling conflicts, then, another necessary condition? And
are we simply to assume that there is a set of precepts which would do the job
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of settling conflicts better than egoism or altruism could? How should we
decide? How can we know what is a good way or a more satisfactory way of
settling conflicts, without knowing what the legitimate overriding precepts
are? But if we knew what they were, what need would we have for the test?
We might possibly be caught in a vicious circle.
Baier's stated test for legitimate overriding precepts seems rather weak in
another respect. All it requires is that a set of precepts be preferable to the rule
of natural inclinations. But if there are any such sets of precepts at all, there
are likely to be an indefinitely large class of such sets of which this is true.
How are we to decide among them? Is Baier's point simply that, if some set of

precepts can pass this test, then the "practice of justification" - of setting
minimum social standards for conduct - can itself be justified? Should we also
use this test to determine whether a community's actual standards are legitimate?
The second stage of the main argument concerns which precepts may be
enforced. This adds an important complication, for, as Baier grants, "the use
of force is objectionable and so calls for justification." As we shall see, however, it is not at all clear that Baier addresses himself directly to this question.
This stage of the argument can also be divided in two. Baier first argues that
certain precepts, which he calls "reflexive," need no support from sanctions.
Then he argues that other precepts, which he calls "distributive," need such

support.
Suppose it is in one's interest to follow a certain precept, regardless of
other's behavior. Then, Baier argues, given normal self-concern, sanctions
would not be needed to guarantee that an individual always has "adequate
reason" to follow it. Baier seems to infer from this that sanctions would not
be justified in such a case. A further implication is suggested, namely, that
paternalistic legislation cannot be justified, that is, laws designed to make a
person serve his own best interests or at least to protect him from his own
imprudent behavior.
As Baier's primary concern is with cases in which sanctions arejustified, his
remarks about reflexive precepts may well be misleading. But they do seem
unsatisfactory as they stand. For they suggest that what is essentially wrong

with social intervention in a person's private affairs is that it simply lacks any
point. There is no need for it. Now this may be wrong in principle, if social
intervention is inherently objectionable. But, in any case, the factual claim

implied by Baier seems mistaken. Ignorance, superstition, pigheadedness and
other factors keep people from following such precepts. Consider, for example, questions of diet, exercise, smoking, hard drugs, and seat belts. If all that
is needed to justify enforcement of self-regarding precepts is the fact that

people won't tend to follow them otherwise, then there is such justification.
This applies on any of the tests suggested by Baier, whether based on a person's
felt concerns, his perceived self-interest, or his actual interest. For a person
does not necessarily do what he has good and sufficient reason to do.
Let us now turn to Baier's "distributive" precepts, general conformity to
which would normally benefit everyone. These are supposed to require other-
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regarding behavior, that is, conduct which can be characterized as favorably
affecting other persons rather than oneself, or that seems to do this. For
Baier's purposes, this further characterization of a "distributive" precept
seems too narrow. He wants to contrast these precepts with those that require
self-regarding behavior and for which sanctions are consequently not sup-

posed to be needed. What is important in this respect about "distributive"
precepts, then, is that they not require self-regarding behavior; we need not
suppose that the behavior they require seems to affect others in a favorable
manner, for the efficacy of useful precepts might be very complicated.

Suppose, then, that it is (normally, at least) in one's interest to follow a
certain precept if others are following it too; but because conformity involves,
say, restraint, effort, or sacrifice, it would not seem advantageous to conform
to it; and it would not in fact be advantageous for one to conform unless

others are generally conforming. Assuming normal self-concern, Baier supposes that one will not have adequate reason to conform to such a precept

unless others are generally conforming. As the same condition applies to
everyone, the only way of reaping the potential benefits from the precept is by
adding motivation to conform. Baier assumes that this must be done by the
use of sanctions. Enforcement would guarantee that enough people will conform, or will have reason to conform, so that any individual will have ade-

quate reason to conform. Baier seems to conclude that the use of social force
would be justified in such cases.

Baier suggests that an "adequate social sanction" would give everyone
"adequate reason" to conform to the precept. But how is this to be understood? I noted earlier, in connection with reflexive precepts, that there can be

and often is a gap between what we have adequate reason to do (because, say,
it is or seems to be in our interest) and what we actually do. The same point

can be applied here. One could have adequate reason to conform to a distributive precept, and not conform to it - even if the reason was provided by
social sanctions. If the social sanctions are determined by what gives an individual adequate reason to conform, rather than what actually makes him
conform, then it could happen that one would have an adequate reason to
conform to a precept, because there is the social sanction which gives everyone else adequate reason to conform, while it would still be true that one

would make a useless sacrifice by conforming. For enough others who have
adequate reason to conform might nevertheless fail to conform, with the
result that the benefits derivable from the general practice are never made
available.

Or does Baier want adequate social sanctions to guarantee general conformity, and not merely to provide adequate reason for each individual to
conform? To achieve this, it is likely that the ante must be raised - the
sanctions must be made more severe, the likelihood of punishment increased,
and so on. This would raise the costs of the whole affair. But perhaps this is
the time to note that Baier ignores the matter of social costs entirely.
Baier granted that "the use of force is objectionable and so calls for justification." But why is it objectionable? Is it only because it may be used to
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support social requirements that could not be justified on any ground? Or is it
also because sanctions involve some cost in, say, human suffering? In deciding

when sanctions would be justified, Baier only considers their possible effectiveness in securing conformity. He ignores the price that must be paid for
having them even when the practice would otherwise be beneficial. But this
price must be one reason why the use of force is initially objectionable, and so
it cannot legitimately be ignored. But if it is not ignored, then Baier's tests

must be altered significantly.
For Baier argues as if we can select precepts first and then justify enforcement of them simply on the ground that they would not be respected otherwise. This is a good Hobbesian position. But Baier does not say that desirable
precepts are worth enforcing at any price (nor would it be plausible to say this),

so he has given us no reason for ignoring the human costs of enforcement, of
coercion, of compulsion. One would suppose, then, that the benefits to be

reaped from the general practice must at least outweigh such social costs. (One
might also require, incidentally, that the resulting distribution of benefits and
burdens, once sanctions are added, still befair.) It is possible, therefore, that
some otherwise desirable precepts of the "distributive" variety should not be

enforced. This is not because they would not need enforcement, but because
they may be so difficult to enforce, or their benefits may be so small in relation
to the price of enforcement, that their enforcement would not be worth while
and thus could not be justified. One should perhaps take one's cues from
Bentham here, rather than from Hobbes.

At this point, and by way of conclusion, it seems natural to wonder whether
other means might be used to guarantee general conformity to the precepts.

Baier says little about such possibilities, no doubt because he is chiefly concerned with the rationale of coercive sanctions. He seems to suggest, however
(though he admittedly does not actually say), that measures short of compulsion or the use of social force do not need any justification. But this is
questionable. Any form of social intervention, even including the use of in-

ducements or rewards, is likely to have some costs. And, regardless of the
costs, one might even think that any form of social intervention is inherently

objectionable - simply because it is intervention. This does not mean that our
concern about the behavior of others is illegitimate, only that our interference

always stands in need of justification.
Afterthoughts. Short of challenging Baier's general approach to justification

and to the criticism or evaluation of social rules (which I did not attempt in
my original comments), the most important questions, it would seem, concern

his basic test for the legitimacy of overriding precepts (whether they be "reflexive" or "distributive"). My main question about this test remains unanswered: Why is thisparticular test - which Baier simply lays down and does
not argue for - not to be regarded as arbitrary? But other questions emerged

during the discussion period following Baier's paper and in private conversations. Baier suggested that the idea of a precept's being "preferable from anyone's point of view" to alternatives can be glossed as their being "for the good
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of everyone alike," a phrase used in his book, The MoralPoint of View. But
he also indicated that the most preferable precepts would distribute goods or
serve the persons concerned equally. This added stricture is not apparent in
either formulation, since it is possible for all to benefit to some degree while
they benefit unequally. The differences between precepts that would serve

everyone equally and those that would merely serve everyone (equally or unequally) brings to mind the possibility of other cases, e.g., where the vast
majority would benefit greatly but one person would not benefit or suffer at
all; where the majority would benefit but a few would suffer; where many
would benefit greatly and many would suffer slightly, and so on - the range of

possibilities obviously fills a wide spectrum that might be accommodated to
considerations of justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens. And it
also became clear in these discussions that Baier wanted in effect to build

substantive considerations of justice into his test for legitimate precepts. It
would seem desirable to make this clear and explicit. Moreover, in view of
the range of possible precepts which Baier apparently would want to certify
as legitimate, under certain circumstances - on the grounds of their effecting

justice in those conditions, it would seem desirable for him to reconsider the
form and content of his test for precepts entirely. If certain considerations of
justice are to rule, then (even if they are not the sole considerations that are
relevant) it would seem preferable to incorporate them explicitly. This would

not only have the advantage of indicating more clearly the intended nature of
the test for precepts, it would also provide a way of covering many more cases
than Baier's test could possibly cover as it now stands.
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